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Essay: Iran and the Military
Option
Dr. Gregory P. Noone†
When politicians, pundits, and prognosticators discuss the
“military option” for Iran it is important to understand that it
will in all likelihood result in a full scale international armed
conflict. If the “military option” mission is to eliminate Iran’s
nuclear capabilities, there is no one target to destroy, bomb, or
obliterate that will render Iran’s nuclear program dead therefore
making such an option unlikely to be quick or efficient. A
conflict with Iran would involve an extensive air campaign and
probably result in Iran launching missiles at Israel and Eastern
Europe. The Persian Gulf would effectively be closed off as a
result of maritime combat and the worldwide threat of terrorist
attacks would have far reaching consequences. The cost of
armed conflict with Iran is incalculable with the potential to
further destabilize the region as well as the global economy.

The purpose of this essay is not to analyze the agreed upon Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action nuclear agreement of July 2015
between the E3/EU+3 (mainly China, France, Germany, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States of America) with the Islamic
Republic of Iran.1 Other authors have taken on that task. The
purpose of this essay is to understand what exactly the “military
option” means in practice with regards to destroying Iran’s nuclear
program.
Let’s be clear: when politicians, pundits, and prognosticators
discuss the “military option” for Iran we are in fact discussing a full
on war. If the mission is to eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, there
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1.

Eric Pichon, Nuclear Deal with Iran—What Are the Implications of the
14 July 2015 Agreement?, EUR. PARLIAMENTARY RES. SERV. BLOG
(Sept. 2, 2015), http://epthinktank.eu/2015/09/02/nuclear-deal-withiran-what-are-the-implications-of-the-14-july-2015-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/P8ZH-2Y3Z].
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is no one target to destroy, bomb, or obliterate that will render Iran’s
nuclear program dead. Iran deliberately and effectively spread its
nuclear program throughout the country, as well as placed it deep
underground, in order to avoid this very scenario.2 Iran learned its
lesson from the successful 1981 Israeli air strike on the Osirek nuclear
reactor that was under construction in Iraq.3 Not only will a single air
mission not work, even with the Massive Ordinance Penetrator,
capable of destroying underground facilities, it is highly unlikely that
a sustained air campaign alone will succeed.4 Instead, combat troops
will be required on the ground, in a very inhospitable terrain, in order
to achieve the mission of annihilating Iran’s nuclear capability. In
other words, the “military option” for Iran will consist of significant
military action resembling in fact and in law––armed conflict and the
invasion of a sovereign nation.
First and foremost, the United States possesses the most powerful
and professional military in the history of the world and is far
superior to Iran’s military.5 However, never underestimate the enemy–
–especially on its home soil. Facing an opposing force in a
conventional military arena is not a problem for the United States
military, but there are many ways countries may counter
overwhelming force and Iran is no different.
Iran has an aging anti-aircraft capacity, but any air campaign
would still require degrading its radar, anti-aircraft firepower, and air
force.6 This is not impossible by any means, as the US air power
2.

See James S. Robbins, A Grim Prognosis: If Diplomacy Fails, Halting
Iran’s Nuclear Weapons Ambitions Could Mean a Larger War Than the
U.S. Is Willing to Take on, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2015/04/24/ending-irans-nuclear-program-would-require-morethan-a-few-airstrikes [https://perma.cc/3E2R-J8CY] (“Iran has no such
singlepoint [sic],high vulnerability target, and Warden, [a U.S. Air Force
combat veteran], notes that Tehran has ‘done a nice job of camouflaging
[its nuclear program], concealing it, putting it deep underground.’”).

3.

Id.

4.

Adam Entous & Julian E. Barnes, Pentagon Seeks Mightier Bomb vs.
Iran, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2012),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203363504577187420287
098692 [https://perma.cc/XJ6D-GLBR].

5.

E.g., Who’s afraid of America?, ECONOMIST (June 13, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/international/21654066-militaryplaying-field-more-even-it-has-been-many-years-big
[https://perma.cc/VL28-ZXR8].

6.

Elisabeth Bumiller, Iran Raid Seen as a Huge Task for Israeli Jets,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/20/world/middleeast/iran-raid-seenas-complex-task-for-israeli-military.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/VQK4-9T3N].
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consisting of U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force assets
are far superior to any other nations’, including Iran’s.7 But success
will come with a cost; Iranians possess the Russian manufactured S300 long-range surface-to-air missile system and reportedly purchased
and received shipment on five additional S-300 systems in December
2015/January 2016.8 The S-300 is a sophisticated and effective
weapon system that could be deployed to protect valuable targets
and/or deny access to Iranian airspace. The fact of the matter is that
there is always a “golden BB” out there somewhere––pilots and planes
will be lost. As a result, additional forces will be needed on standby to
rescue downed pilots and will also be immediately placed in harm’s
way.
The effort to eliminate Iran’s anti-aircraft capacity is simply the
prelude for the real target––Iran’s powerful ballistic missile capability,
featuring the mobile and quick to launch Sejjil I and II surface-tosurface ballistic missile.9 To eliminate this threat, Iran’s ballistic
missile launchers, delivery systems and production would need to be
destroyed. Iran’s ballistic missile capability must be degraded as
quickly and as early as possible during the air campaign because Iran
will start launching missiles at numerous targets. Iran’s missiles can
reach Israel, an obvious target for Iran, but also as far as
Southeastern/Eastern Europe, and any number of U.S. and allied
assets in between.10 Ballistic missile defense systems (e.g. Patriot and
sea-based Aegis warships) deployed in the region to protect allies
would only limit the damage.

7.

Compare The World Fact Book: United States, U.S. CENT. INTELL.
AGENCY, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/us.html [https://perma.cc/QLG6-MKS3] (listing of
all military branches in the US military - military expenditures as 4.35
percent of GDP in 2012); The World Fact Book: Iran, U.S. CENT.
INTELL. AGENCY, available at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/geos/ir.html [https://perma.cc/UE6U-LNXX] (listing of all
military branches in the Iranian military).

8.

Sneha Shankar, Russia to Hand Over First Set of S-300 Defense Missile
System to Iran on Thursday, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2016),
http://www.ibtimes.com/russia-hand-over-first-set-s-300-defense-missilesystem-iran-thursday-2310525 [https://perma.cc/JQU5-4PUE].

9.

See generally Anthony H. Cordesman & Bryan Gold, The Gulf Military
Balance Volume II: The Missile and Nuclear Dimensions, CTR.
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Dec. 9, 2013),
http://csis.org/files/publication/131207_gulf_military_balance.pdf
[https://perma.cc/PP7H-JWKW].

10.

See Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program, U.S. INST. PEACE
(Aug. 2015), http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-ballistic-missileprogram [https://perma.cc/4CB4-9SFR].
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If Iran were to selectively target lawful military objectives in
accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict, the missiles could do
significant damage. If Iran chooses to be less selective and willingly
violates the Law of Armed Conflict, it could rein terror from above on
numerous civilian centers. Iran has spent so much time outside of the
international “family of nations” that it is not beyond anyone’s
imagination that it could view an attack from the U.S. and its allies
as a true existential threat, and adhere to Bismarck’s maxim of not
obeying the law in the face of losing one’s nation.11
Lastly, with respect to any air campaign, after striking any
targets with air power a battle damage assessment would be necessary
to determine whether the target was destroyed, damaged, or missed.
In other words, does the target need to be hit again and if so––how
hard? The battle damage assessment may be accomplished with
satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, and ground presence.12 Accurate
battle damage assessments are critical, and may be accomplished, but
potentially with a cost to planes, pilots, and combat forces on the
ground.
Iran, however, is not limited to air defense and missiles. Arguably,
Iran’s military is most dangerous on the water. The only entrance and
exit into the Persian Gulf is through the Strait of Hormuz.13 The
Strait of Hormuz is an international strait under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), and therefore, all
nations have unfettered access through the right of Transit Passage.14
11.

For an explanation of Bismarck’s maxim, see generally Joan Edan
Friedlander, Corporation and Kulturkampf: Time Culture as Illegal
Fiction, 29 CONN. L. REV. 31, 89 (1996).

12.

U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER,
COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK FOR JOINT BATTLE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, I-1
(June 1, 2004),
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/doctrine/jwfc/hbk_jbda.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UTF9-ER5T].

13.

Abdul Jalil Zayd Marhoon, How Security In Strait of Hormuz Brings
US, Iran Closer, AL-MONITOR (June 23, 2015), http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/06/gulf-arab-security-coordinationhormuz-strait.html# [http://perma.cc/Z9S8-DTLN].

14.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 37, opened for
signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 (entered into
force Nov. 16, 1994); see also Nilufer Oral, Transit Passage Rights in
the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s Threats to Block the Passage of Oil
Tankers, AM. SOCIETY INT’L L. (May 3, 2012), available at
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/16/issue/16/transit-passagerights-strait-hormuz-and-iran%E2%80%99s-threats-block-passage
[https://perma.cc/B7JA-JGUQ] (“According to UNCLOS, the transit
passage regime applies to âstraits [sic] which are used for international
navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic
zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.[]
Iran, by its own declaration, is obliged to respect the transit passage
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However, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy––
a hardline entity in Iranian internal politics––views this narrow and
shallow strait as a strategic choke point, where all ships must pass,
thereby rendering them vulnerable.15 The Persian Gulf is an
important waterway for supporting any potential attack on Iran and
it is perhaps even more important to the global economy by supplying
approximately twenty percent of the world’s oil (roughly 16.5 billion
barrels per day travel through the Strait).16 Removing that much oil
from the global market, however, would not have the same effect it
would have had if this occurred thirty years ago, because of the many
non-OPEC producers today. With that said, the uncertainty of when
the Strait would reopen to commercial traffic could influence the
markets in a negative fashion.
The IRGC Navy has numerous weapons at its disposal when
trying to make things difficult for the U.S. Navy and allied navies.
Mines are a standard feature of Persian Gulf warfare and would likely
be deployed again in an effort to shut down the Strait.17 Iran also
possesses approximately two-dozen midget submarines that are
difficult to detect and have mine and torpedo capabilities.18 The
IRGC Navy has scores of high-speed small attack boats with torpedo

rights of all vessels flying the flag of states party to UNCLOS, both
commercial and military.”).
15.

Kenneth Katman et al, Iran’s Threat to the Strait of Hormuz, CONG.
RES. SERV. 5 (Jan. 23, 2012),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R42335.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5UVG-NTEZ].

16.

Strait of Hormuz is chokepoint for 20% of world’s oil, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 5, 2012), available at
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=7830
[http://perma.cc/PVT3-P7KA].

17.

See David Wood, U.S., Iran Poised for Mine Warfare In the Persian
Gulf, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 28, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/27/us-iran-mine-warfarepersian-gulf_n_1304107.html [http://perma.cc/JWY5-F4D5] (providing
an example of Iran’s use of mine warfare in the Persian Gulf in the
recent past).

18.

See Fact Sheet: Iran’s Submarine Force, INST. FOR THE STUDY WAR
(June 21, 2012), available at
http://www.understandingwar.org/reference/fact-sheet-irans-submarineforce [https://perma.cc/BGV3-J9U4] (stating that Iran has around 19
Ghadir Class Submarines which are difficult to detect and track and are
capable of firing large torpedoes and mines); Sam LaGrone, Iran
Launches New Submarine Class, USNI NEWS, (Nov. 27, 2013),
http://news.usni.org/2013/11/27/iran-launches-new-submarine-class
[https://perma.cc/HV9L-BGLB] (calling the submarines “Ghadir-class
midget submarine[s]”).
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and missile capabilities.19 Lastly, the IRGC Navy has the supersonic
Khalij-e Fars anti-ship ballistic missile (referred to as the “carrier
killer”) that Iran boasts as accurate and devastating.20 All of these
assets make maritime operations in this region difficult and extremely
dangerous. Success will be achieved on the seas but will come at a
steep price.
Finally, there is the reality of worldwide asymmetric retaliation
from the terrorist organizations Iran supports such as Hezbollah and
Hamas21––not to mention the possibility of “lone wolf” terrorist
attacks across Europe and North America. The versatility and reach
of Hezbollah (e.g. the attack on the Asociación Mutual Israelita
Argentina in 1994)22 makes it one of the most feared weapons in
Iran’s arsenal. Therefore, it should be of little comfort that because
military action could not possibly eliminate all nuclear material, any
potentially remaining material could be made available for terrorist
attacks.

Conclusion
In the final analysis, an attack would in all likelihood make the
Iranians more determined to be a nuclear power so that no one in the
future will dare attack them again. It would make most Iranians more
extreme on the nuclear issue and quiet any moderating voices in the
country. The agreement gives us a more durable solution than any
“military option” ever could. Another positive, if not cynical view, is
that the agreement provides access to their nuclear facilities for a

19.

Berenice Baker, Iran’s fast attack craft fleet: behind the hyperbole,
(Jan. 17, 2013), available at
http://www.naval-technology.com/features/featureiran-fast-attack-craftfleet-behind-hyperbole/ [https://perma.cc/8B7B-PTWY].
NAVAL-TECHNOLOGY.COM

20.

Zachary Keck, Meet Iran’s “Carrier Killer”: The Khalij Fars, DIPLOMAT
(May 13, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/05/meet-irans-carrierkiller-the-khalij-fars/ [https://perma.cc/G3YV-KKDM].

21.

See Chapter 3: Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, U.S. DEP’T STATE
(Apr. 2015), available at
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm
[https://perma.cc/W6VT-WALC] (stating that “Iran has historically
provided weapons, training, and funding to Hamas and other Palestinian
terrorist groups,” and that “[s]ince the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizballah
conflict, Iran has also assisted in rearming Lebanese Hizballah, in direct
violation of UNSCR 1701. General Amir Ali Hajizadeh, head of the
IRGC Aerospace Force stated in November that “The IRGC and
Hezbollah are a single apparatus jointed together”).

22.

Iran charged over Argentina bomb, BBC News (Oct, 25, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/6085768.stm
[https://perma.cc/5V8F-N9BJ].
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better intelligence picture on where everything is located if in the
future the U.S. and its allies needs to consider military action.
On the international level, Iran is arguably an important player in
countering ISIS/ISIL (a.k.a. Daesh) and a U.S. attack on Iran may
give this brutal terrorist organization more space to operate.
Domestically, the cost in blood and treasure in Iraq and Afghanistan
was staggering with nearly 7,000 troops making the ultimate sacrifice
and an estimated cost of $6 trillion in fifteen years of combat.23
Moreover, the dollar amount doesn’t factor in the long-term cost of
veterans’ healthcare, rendering the cost of armed conflict with Iran
incalculable.
Ultimately, any military strike may destabilize the entire region
and result in wider conflict as well as have a consequential effect on
the global economy. This is more than simply putting bombs on a
target. Any military action will have a significant and far reaching
impact on the region and beyond.

23.

Face of the Fallen, WASH. POST,
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/national/fallen/
[https://perma.cc/CY3X-TAMR]; Mark Thompson, The True Cost of
the Afghanistan War May Surprise You, TIME (Jan. 1, 2015),
http://time.com/3651697/afghanistan-war-cost/
[https://perma.cc/8CCE-JWCC].
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